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The performing arts in South Africa have been state-funded for
many decades. The exclusive recipients are the four
performing arts councils (PACs) - one in each province. The
largest of these is the Performing Arts Council of the
Transvaal (PACT). Of the R80 million distributed to the PACs
in 1993, PACT received about R35 million. PACT employs about
2 400 people and is situated in the heart of Pretoria in a
modern, twelve-story building.
PACT (in Afrikaans, TRUK) was established in 1963, the heyday
of Verwoedian grand apartheid, to serve the cultural interests
of the white population'. As an ideology production centre
for the newly constituted Republic of South Africa, PACT'S
(unstated) task was to institutionalise and promote
volkskultuur. In the spirit of Afrikaner Nationalism, PACT
actively centred Afrikaner interests. PACT'S State Theatre is
a tell-tale sign: located on Strijdom Square in Pretoria, it
is watched over by an over-scaled bust of J.G. Strijdom - the
architect of apartheid - framed by a towering arc of concrete.
The State Theatre is a monument to the culture of
Afrikanerdom2.
The purpose of this paper is not to argue that PACT was
influenced by National Party policy and, as a result, assisted
in the construction of the symbolic world of apartheid'.
Rather, premised to some extent on that assumption, the
central task here is to ascertain how government hegemony was
secured in PACT in the context of an attempt to understand the
ways in which democracy functions, and is undermined, in a
cultural parastatal.
This paper is not a history of PACT; rather, it is an analysis
of contemporary PACT (1990-93). But, since the past informs
the present so forcefully; since the latter day PACT cannot be
accurately interpreted without an understanding of the history
that shaped it; and since effective proposals regarding
democratisation require a historical and evolutionary
approach, aspects of PACT'S history are analysed in some
detail. This paper does not, therefore, attempt a
comprehensive history; rather, it is selective and uneven in
its detail because it explores only those historical strands
that contribute to an understanding of the present.
The focus here is on one key aspect of a composite definition
a democratic (cultural) parastatal: the relationship between
the government and the cultural parastatal. While no attempt
is made to construct an abstract definition of democracy in
this context, it is inevitable, in the course of the analysis
that follows, that some normative claims about the generic
relationship between tite cultural parastatal and the
government are made.
The major claim is that while a cultural parastatal should be
an "arm's-length" body4 that enjoys a high degree of autonomy,
government intervention does not undermine democratic practice
per se. Government has a role to play in ensuring that its
resources and finances are used to construct and maintain
equality of opportunity - a fundamental tenet of democracy -
within the cultural sector. This might entail biasing
distribution towards disadvantaged and underdeveloped sectors.
Interventionalism of this type is not tantamount to political
manipulation of the arts - encouraging one form of cultural
production at the expense of others. While government should
not attempt to determine the content of cultural life, the
assumption here is that it must, in pursuit of democracy, play
a role in producing conditions conducive to artistic self
expression and to public access and participation.
1. PACT'S artistic policy - a brief background
Before turning to the analysis of how the government secured
hegemony in PACT, a brief summary of the contents and
political implications of PACT'S programmes will be offered.
PACT privileged two art forms: original Afrikaans-medium drama
and the nineteenth century European "high arts" (opera,
ballet, and classical music)3. This dual focus is central to
an understanding of PACT'S ideological production, reflecting,
as it does, the contradictions of an internal colonialist6
culture - of a people in, but not of, Africa. Afrikanerdom,
in attempting to define itself as "a distinct and separate
nation with its own history, traditions, religion, philosophy,
language and culture" (de Villiers, 1971: 367), had to
distinguish itself from the imperial culture of the mother
continent without identifying with the indigenous culture of
the colonised.
Post-colonial theorists7 assert that as one of the processes
of colonisation, the imperial culture is instituted as the
norm while the culture of the colonised is marginalised. This
normative culture is imbued with value—civilisation,
linguistic and aesthetic superiority—in the process of
constructing the culture of the colonised as its inferior,
savage "other". The imperial culture denigrates the
indigenous culture to justify its conquest and subsequent rule
of the colony.
But the Afrikaner nation was both coloniser and colonised (by
the British). Afrikaner culture, in establishing its
hegemony, had to undermine African culture in order to assert
itself as civilised. But, in the same movement, it had to
establish itself as "indigenous". In this lay its
contradiction.
Because it had no other cultural foundation from which to
draw, the art forms its adopted were European. But because it
was alienated from modern Europe (its political identification
with modern Europe would have undermined it colonialist
discourse), it adopted the remnants of another era, of a
Europe before its perversion by post-war liberalism. Even in
contemporary Europe, the "high arts" are strands from the
past, rarely living cultural forms. For the Afrikaner
Nationalists who adopted them, the "high arts" represent an
"imagined" (in Benedict Anderson's sense) culture: an image of
a long past phantom civilisation that is and is not European;
is and is not African.
On the margins of the symbolic configuration of cultures that
PACT helped to construct was indigenous South African
performance tradition8. As late as 1990, PACT'S General
Director betrayed his contempt for the full rich history of
South African culture:
If all eurocentric art is to be removed from South
Africa, there will be precious little left on which
a new cultural norm or image can be built in a new
South Africa. (PACT Annual Report 1990-1)
It is not surprising, then, that despite its privileged access
to funds, PACT was never "at the cutting edge of cultural
innovation in South Africa" (Louw, 1989: 109). The "explosion
of indigenous theatre" (Orkin, 1991: 181) in the 1970s and
1980s, for example - the new directions and energies of
Workshop '71; of the Black Consciousness theatre of Nkosi,
Shezi, Manaka, Maponya; of the Market Theatre Productions -
were in no way associated with PACT. Throughout its history,
PACT used public money to encourage the European "high arts"
to the detriment of indigenous South African drama9.
2. Methodology
Anti-apartheid theatre historiography and criticism is located
primarily within a marxist paradigm. This corpus, as Ian
Steadman observes, foregrounds class and race relations in
cultural practice. While this tendency might have been a
necessary response to apartheid cultural discourse, it
resulted in a paucity of criticism that explores other social
relations and identities - gender, religious and ethnic, for
example (Steadman, 1990a: 211).
The use of marxist theory, it is argued here, was responsible
for further limitations in anti-apartheid cultural
historiography. The major burden of Foucault's critigue of
juridico-discursive conceptions of power is that western
political thought, up to and including marxist theories of the
state, has proved incapable of recognising the capillary
network of power relations associated with the development of
modern forms of government. This failure stems from that
theory still envisaging power as emanating from a single
source (as in the monarchical model). For Foucault, the
systematising and totalitarian tendencies of marxist theory -
its concern with power at central locations - has an
inhibiting effect. Marxism posed the problem of power only in
terms of the State apparatus:
the way power was exercised - concretely and in
detail - with its specificity and tactics, was
something that noone attempted to ascertain; they
contented themselves with denouncing it in a
polemical and global fashion. (Foucault, 1980a: 116)
Anti-apartheid cultural historiography, while offering the
finest documentation and analysis of South African theatre, is
undermined by this tendency. Take Robert Kavanagh's Theatre
and cultural struggle in South Africa (1991) and Orkin's Drama
and the South African State (1985) - two of the major works in
this corpus. Both contest official histories and perceptions;
they attempt to give voice to silenced texts and to recentre
marginalised traditions. Both, through rigorous historical
analysis, produce instances of penetrating insight: Kavanagh's
identification of apartheid segregationist discourse as a
catalyst of Gibson Rente's township theatre (1985: 113-122);
Orkin's rereading of H.E. Dhlomo as the first South African
dramatist to contest colonial versions of traditional
societies (1991: 22-43).
However, regarding the relations between culture and power,
both authors tend towards a monolithic approach. They seek,
in their analyses of the social conditions that produced
various theatres, simply to locate - often in broad terms -
the hand of the capitalist state. This leads, at times, to a
clumsy reductionism. Kavanagh, for example, makes a simple
link between the class position of an author and the
revolutionary potential of her or his play (1985: 187) . And
with Orkin, the plays tend to serve a secondary role of
illustrating the historical analysis of state (and
oppositional) discourses. In both cases, the subtler
mechanics of power - the small local factors that produce or
inhibit theatrical production - slip through the wide net of
state-centric analysis.
Their textual analyses are also, at times, marred by a similar
reductionism. Plays tend to be evaluated in terms of the
extent to which they achieve Brechtian objectives - the
revelation of characters as products of their social
relations, for example. Hence Kavanagh criticises the Black
Consciousness dramatists of the 1970s for their class-
blindness and Orkin guestions the contestatory power of
Fugard's existentialism - the search for some viable assertion
of "self" in a desolate world - insofar as it is part of
liberal discourse. This prescriptiveness fosters a
functionalist approach towards drama; the political efficacy
of drama is reduced to its ability to perform a marxist
critique10.
A monolithic view of the relations between power and culture,
evident in Kavanagh's and Orkin's criticism, obscures the
struggles located in the fine meshes of the web of power.
This analytical deficiency impacts on current debates around
PACT: in short, it creates the space for neo-conservatives to
oppose thorough-going transformation of the PACs". For, if
the power that shaped cultural practice emanated from the
state, then the state's transformation will lead to that of
the PACs. Since the mechanics of power at the local level
have not been thoroughly analysed (or taken simply to be the
points of application of the state's power), there is no
apparent justification for overhauling specifics. To the
contrary, the call for concrete transformation - of
infrastructure, organisational structure, etc - can be
construed as an expedient politicisation of neutral terrain
(see, for example, TRUK/PACT Info 3. 1992: 2).
Foucault's remedy for marxism's totalising tendency is a
discontinuous, particular and local criticism:
I believe that what this essentially local character
of criticism indicates in reality is an autonomous
non-centralised kind of theoretical production, one
that is to say whose validity is not dependent on
the approval of established regimes of thoughts.
(1980: 81)
On this basis, while this paper recognises (and demonstrates)
that PACT was strongly and consistently influenced by National
Party policy, a variety of approaches is employed in
ascertaining how government hegemony was secured in PACT. The
role of specific individuals and infrastructure, for example,
are considered in an attempt to locate the precise
articulations of power within PACT.
In the main, it is argued, government hegemony was not the
result of government interference. The government seldom
issued directives, nor did it infiltrate ideological watchdogs
into PACT. On the contrary, senior staff have always
experienced a high degree of autonomy. They make their
decisions freely - without, on the whole, consulting a guiding
policy document or a more senior individual. And yet, in
practice, they tend to conform to narrow policy.
Power in PACT, it will be argued, is not implemented in a top-
down manner but, rather, via a series of internal mechanisms
and practices. In this case, it is a tendency to employ
senior staff who automatically confine themselves within the
ideological parameters acceptable to the state. Senior staff
need not be schooled in company policy; they police
themselves.
The significance of this argument is twofold. Firstly, it
informs a central guiding principle of this paper: that, while
PACT served certain social interests directly and powerfully,
this was not always a conscious process. The artistic
directors did not, in 1963, set out to consolidate Afrikaner
Nationalist achievements; rather, they endeavoured to nurture
their art forms. Their personal sympathies - to the
struggling Afrikaans actor or the culturally deprived rural
town, for example - are as important a determinant of PACT'S
Afrikaner Nationalist tendency as any government directive.
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Secondly, the observation that PACT'S character is shaped by
its staff's automatic, naturalised responses as much as by
deliberate strategy, has a far-reaching implication for the
process of transformation: a simple change of policy and
government directive is unlikely to be effective. If power is
not - and cannot be - implemented in a top-down manner, then
it is insufficient simply to make changes at the top. The
attitudes of the staff who run PACT on a daily basis will not
be transformed by new organisational policy. Individuals are
vehicles of power, and not, as totalizing theories would have
it, its points of application.
In addition to the role of individuals, this paper gives
careful consideration to the impact of PACT'S infrastructure
on its policies. Infrastructure, it is suggested, has the
character of pre-selection and pre-decision: a hidden-hand
function with its own inertia. Key elements of PACT'S
artistic and political character are determined by its
centralised organisational structure - centralisation disposes
PACT towards serving an elite sector of artists and audiences.
Inversely, the drive towards the centralisation of
infrastructure and control was fuelled by two major factors -
a Eurocentric vision of the performing arts and an attempt to
preserve PACT'S domination by whites. Regarding PACT'S
transformation, then, it is necessary to consider the way in
which current infrastructure might undermine PACT'S capacity
to implement new policy.
In exploring the operation of power in PACT, this paper
employs a further aspect of (broad) Foucauldian methodology in
its attempt to utilise local memories, subjugated and popular
knowledges:
a whole set of knowledges that have been
disqualified as inadequate to their task or
insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges located
down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of
cognition or scientificity. (Foucault, 1980: 33)
In particular, the knowledges of the Performing Arts Workers
Equity's (PAWE)'s constituency - the workers within PACT and
the performing artists neglected by PACT - inform both general
perspectives and particular arguments of this paper12. An
analysis of PACT'S industrial relations (IR) policy, for
example, combines the "naive knowledge" of the blue-collar
workers with a broader historical analysis of South African
IR. The resultant argument is that PACT'S harsh IR regime -
anomalous in the context of the IR profiles of other
parastatals in the 1990s - was prompted by a perceived
political peril. In its effort to preserve its white,
Eurocentric orientation, PACT attempted to rid itself of
unions that sought political, as well as industrial,
transformation.
The popular perception that PACT, despite its recent
proclamations of egalitarianism, fails to provide broad access
8to the performing arts, is explored and substantiated in this
paper. It is argued that PACT'S production orientation
inhibits access. The bulk of its subsidy (the only public
money set aside for the performing arts in the Transvaal) is
used to finance its venues, companies and administration; none
of it reaches independent companies, producers or theatres.
Only a handful of performing artists in the Transvaal (those
employed by PACT) and their limited audiences enjoy
subsidisation. It is proposed, on this basis, that a
significant part of PACT'S responsibility should be to
allocate grants - that PACT should distribute its subsidy to
groupings outside of itself.
3. Case Study
3.1. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
PACT is a public but non-governmental organisation. While its
primary source of income is an annual grant-in-aid from the
Department of National Education, it is not a government
department or agency. It is registered in terms of Section 21
of the Companies Act of 1973, as an Association not for Gain.
PACT is autonomous from its sister PACs, the Cape Performing
Arts Board (CAPAB), the Natal Performing Arts Council (NAPAC),
and the Performing Arts Council of the Orange Free State
(PACOFS). The four regional PACs are part of a coordinating
body, the South African Coordinating Performing Arts Council
(SACPAC). SACPAC has a solely advisory function towards the
regional councils: it recommends a particular modus operand!
or policy (usually in the sphere of personnel management and
the circulation of productions). Its recommendations are
given effect only if approved by the regional councils.
SACPAC is therefore not an authoritative coordinating
institution for the four regional councils.
PACT'S activities are controlled by a non-executive Board of
Directors. The Board is formally constituted as
representative of the public to oversee the spending of public
money. The sixteen-member Board is appointed by the Minister
of Education ("Articles of Association of Performing Arts
Council Transvaal", hereafter, "Articles of Association",
1986: 3).
The daily running of PACT is entrusted to the Directorate,
comprising the General Director and the Deputy Director. The
Directorate is responsible to the Board of Directors. The
General Director is the most senior executive and
administrative official of PACT.
The organisation comprises various arts and service
departments that account to the Directorate. There are six
arts departments, each of which confines itself to the
presentation of a particular art form - ballet, drama, opera,
orchestra, music, and contemporary dance (since 1989).
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For the last few years, PACT has employed over two thousand
people. In 1991, of its 2 338 employees, 834 were permanent
and 1 304 were temporary; 1 436 were artistic staff and 902
were non-artistic staff.
PACT'S Pretoria-based head office is a twelve-story building
which houses the administrative, artistic and technical
activities of the organisation. There is a Johannesburg
office - based since 1983 at the Windybrow - which, working in
close association with the Pretoria head office, is
responsible for the English Drama Company and its productions.
The Johannesburg office has its own technical and
administrative staff and rehearsal facilities.
PACT controls the following theatre complexes: the State
Theatre (Pretoria), which comprises six theatres, the
Windybrow (Johannesburg), which comprises three theatres, and
the Alexander (Johannesburg), which comprises two theatres.
(PACT has an exclusive ten year lease on the Alexander - as of
1984). These theatres are centrally controlled from Pretoria:
their budgets, artistic programming, industrial relations,
etc, are determined and supervised by head office.
3.2. CONTROL
3.2.1. Relationship to government
(i) Legal relationship
The PACs were established by the National Party government in
1963. They fell under the aegis of the Department of
Education, Arts and Science (later National Education), which
issued the PACs' first grants-in-aid. The PACs are parastatal
- intermediary bodies that (in theory, at least), using public
money, are controlled by an independent Board of Directors
rather than a government department.
The PACs' Section 21 status does not accord them independence
from the government; rather, it implies that their operations
are more commercially defined than those of a government
department. The government, in fact, controls PACT in
important ways.
Firstly, since its inception, PACT has been "owned" entirely
by the state (through the mechanism of government appointed
members)13. Secondly, the appointment of the Board of
Directors, PACT'S controlling body, is the responsibility of
the Minister of National Education ("Articles of Association",
1986: 4). Hence, while the appointments themselves are not
political14, they are determined by the government. Thirdly,
PACT'S Memorandum of Association stipulates that the Board of
Directors "controls... the Company [PACT]... subject to such
directions as may be issued by the Minister of National
Education ("Memorandum of Association", 1973: 6, my emphasis).
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(ii) Government interference
Senior officials of the PACs have, without exception, always
insisted that "as far as the artistic field is concerned, [the
government] ha[s] not tried to interfere" (Anon, 1987: 8).
With specific regard to PACT, Eghard van der Hoven, former
General Director, contends that PACT suffered no government
interference during his years as General Director (1967-1983)
(Author interview, 09/12/1991, Pretoria). Most recently,
Louis Bezuidenhout, in his capacity as PACT'S deputy Executive
Officer asserted that "the Performing Arts, as managed by
PACT, has always distanced itself from politics" (PACT/TRUK
Info 3, 1992: 2).
Yet since their inception, the PACs stand accused of being
"the state's ideology-production centres" (Louw, 1989: 101)
or, in the words of former SACPAC chair. Justice Kriek, "we
are perceived as a government stooge" (Anon, 1987: 8).
PACT'S government appointed Board is not in itself evidence of
governmental interference. Many countries, including the
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the
Netherlands and, more recently, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Cuba,
have arts councils whose policy makers are government
appointees. The extent to which they represent the
government, however, varies greatly. In the United Kingdom,
for example, parliament, "by a self denying ordinance" (Lord
Redcliffe-Maud cited in Fisher, 1987: 1), votes money to the
Arts Council of Great Britain, but has no say in how it is
spent.
What is striking with regard to the PACT Board of Directors is
not, therefore, that it is appointed by the government, but
rather that its composition has, throughout its history,
reflected the composition of the National Party government.
Between 1963 and 1987, when government policy advocated racial
exclusivity, PACT'S Board of Directors was strictly whites-
only. In 1987, soon after the government adopted the
Tricameral constitution that brought coloureds and Indians
into parliament, PACT'S Articles of Association were amended
to allow for a multi-racial Board, and a limited number of
blacks were subseguently co-opted.
The composition of PACT'S Board is clearly influenced by
government policy of the day. It would appear that the
government has appointed Boards of Directors that reflect its
own composition and interests rather than those of PACT'S
constituency. Since 1963 then, PACT'S Board been almost
exclusively white, Afrikaans and male - a configuration that
reflects the racial, gender and linguistic bias of the
National Party. The government has attempted to ensure, via
the process of appointment of the Boards of Directors, that
PACT is controlled by non-government individuals who
nonetheless share its world-view and interests.
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resource) , it has also meant officiating over the
techniques and aesthetics that compose an actor's
formation. Rethinking who can be considered'
professional... makes it possible for performance
skills to respond to particular dramatic problems as
they are developed by emerging theatres. (Martin,
1990: 54-5)
49. The prototype of the arts council is the Arts Council of
Great Britain which was established in 1946. It was the model
for the system of similar councils which come into being
throughout the world. The observations on arts councils that
follow are largely based on these art councils. (See Sullivan
(1988) for a detailed account and comparison of arts councils
internationally).
50. The right to freedom of expression is not always simple. The
promotion racial or sexual violence, for example, can undermine
other rights. While an arts council should be sensitive to these
issues, its task is to facilitate the expression of the artist—
not to serve as moral or social watchdog.
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Apart from appointing sympathetic Boards of Directors, the
government has, it will be argued here, interfered with PAC
policy in more direct ways. PACT'S racial policy, for
example, its most contentious feature, has, throughout its
history, been determined by the National Party government.
PACT'S initial policy of racial exclusivity was, in effect, a
government directive. At their inception, in order to qualify
for government funding, the PACs had to adhere to a fourteen
point government document that, inter alia, disallowed the
presence of black people either on the stage or in the
audience (Anon, 1987: 8). PACT'S desegregation, in the 1980s,
resulted from the advent of the Tricameral Parliament. At
this point, the government instructed the PACs to cater for
all races'*.
The funding relationship between PACT and the government is
another area of interference. Most governments
internationally, in a bid to ensure that the constitutional
principle of freedom of expression is not compromised through
economic censorship, adopt the "arm's-length" principle
whereby the state is legally obliged to provide funding to the
arts, but has no (or limited) say in how it is allocated. The
arts bodies which distribute the funding do have to account,
however, for the expenditure of the money in annual financial
and narrative reports16.
The South African government never established an "arms-
length" relationship with the PACs. This was the major
reason, argued the government-appointed Schutte Commission of
Inquiry in 1984, for the "politicisation" of the arts in South
Africa: the artistic community's distrust of the parastatals,
based on its perception of government interference and
control, and the consequent wide-spread boycott of the PACs by
many local artists (Report of Commission of Inquiry into the
promotion of the creative arts, hereafter, Schutte Commission.
1984: 69). Schutte recommended, therefore, that the PACs be
replaced by a National Arts Council: "an independent,
autonomous umbrella organisation for the promotion of the arts
in South Africa" (Ibid: 8), in relation to which the
government adopts an "arm's length policy" (Ibid: 69).
Instead, in 1987, the government implemented the "Stumpf
formula" which provides a financial incentive for the
presentation of the European "high arts" by positively
weighting the amount of subsidy that opera and ballet (and, to
a lesser extent, symphony orchestra) generate (Department of
National Education, 1986: 12). It is not, therefore,
compatible with the "arm's-length" principle; on the contrary,
it impacts strongly on the PACs' artistic policies.
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3.2.2. Internal Control ,
PACT has never enjoyed autonomy from the government. National
Party policy and strategy strongly and consistently influenced
its policy. This was, in part, the result of government
interference. To a large extent however, government hegemony
was secured in PACT not through direct intervention but,
instead, via a series of internal mechanisms and practices.
This argument crucially enriches our understanding of the ways
in which democracy functions, and is undermined, in a cultural
parastatal.
(i) Internal Control: senior staff
PACT'S Board of Directors is non-executive: it oversees, but
does not partake in, the administration and management of
PACT. The senior staff, the Directorate and the departmental
heads shape PACT'S character in the daily decision-making
process.
The Board has the authority, in theory, to reverse the
decisions of the Directorate and departmental heads. It can
even alter the content of specific productions. The
Directorate submits all its major decisions to the Board for
ratification: the production schedules and budgets of each
department, proposed purchases of assets or property,
suggested policy amendments, and so on (Eghard van der Hoven,
Author interview, 09/12/91, Pretoria). The Directorate's
decision, in the late 1970s, to partially desegregate PACT,
for example, could be implemented only once the Board had
given its approval (Ibid).
But, in practice, the Directorate is a self-determining and
sovereign body. Van der Hoven recalls that, during his term
of office, the Board intervened just once or twice, and even
then, it was only in order to prohibit the use of certain
swear words on stage (Ibid).
Similarly, PACT Drama is managed and guided, without
significant interference, by its departmental heads. Its
policy guidelines were formulated internally rather than by
the Directorate or the Board, and were circumscribed only by
the government's initial mandate to PACT to provide a secure
home for artists and to present professional productions.
This policy document, as opposed to PACT'S Articles and
Memorandum of Association, for example, has provided direction
to PACT Drama17 (Pierre van Pletzen, et al, Author interview,
13/11/1991, Pretoria).
PACT Drama plans and budgets for its own yearly artistic
programmes. Pierre van Pletzen, artistic director of Drama
since 1989, claims that "the Directorate has never questioned
our choice of productions". It might decrease a budget or
postpone a major purchase, but it does not intervene on
substantial issues18 (Ibid).
37
42. The State Theatre's location and luxuriousness was
controversial even among PACT management. Van der Hoven wanted
a Midrand location so as to include Johannesburg audiences
(Author interview, 09/12/1991, Pretoria); van Pletzen was opposed
to the centralisation of PACT'S resources that the State
necessitated (Author interview, 13/11/1991, Pretoria).
43. Van der Hoven was, in fact, reiterating one of PACT'S
founding policy principles, "to provide a fixed income to
performing artists and associated theatre staff in the
country..." (cited in Schutte Commission. 1984: 54).
44. I have substantiated this argument elsewhere (Steinberg,
1993: 53-72).
45. The Schutte Commission of Inquiry (1984) implicitly accepted
that the line drawn between amateur and professional performing
artists acted as racial barrier. Noting that the opportunity for
blacks to professionalise was restricted by lack of training
facilities (Schutte Commission. 1984: 59), Schutte suggested that
his proposed "Arts Council of the Republic of South Africa" serve
both "established professional artists" and "young [amateur]
creative talent" (Ibid: 12).
This recommendation was the logical consequence of the major
objectives of the Schutte Report: the promotion of the full
spectrum of South African artistic traditions; the decentring of
the "high arts"; the deracialisation of the PACs; and the
adoption of a developmental approach towards South African arts.
In short, Schutte recognised that in order to redress the racial
and Eurocentric biases of the PACs, the amateur/professional
divide in the performing arts must be bridged.
46. In 1992, for example, the PACT Drama Company employed
nineteen actors, five directors' and two designers (Programme
note). PACT, as a whole, employed 2 358 (854 full-time, 1 504
temporary) in 1991 (PACT Annual Report 1990-1991: 31).
47. There are some exceptions, for example, the ad-hoc artists
employed by PACT; the participants in the Windybrow Festival; the
odd company'that borrows PACT'S combis, lighting equipment, etc.
48. Martin makes a similar point about decentralisation and
deprofessionalisation with regard to the recent (post 1989)
revolution in Cuban cultural policy:
The decentralization results not in eliminating
planning altogether, but rather in shifting the
emphasis from building theatrical institutions to
making available the resources for creating theatre...
...theatre has to be deprofessionalized before it can
be deinstitutionalized. If professionalization has
insured that certain skills are imparted so that
actors can fit interchangeably into a national network
of theatres (thereby rationalizing the use of a scarce
36
32. The argument here is not against centralisation per se.
Management theory stresses the relative value of centralisation.
Child has formulated (or summarised) generally accepted points
in favour of both centralisation and decentralisation (cited in
Kakabadse, et al, 1988: 336-339). Kakabadse, et al argue that
the choice to centralise can only be made in the light of
specific conditions and circumstances—both internal and external
to the organisation (1988: 339). Handy argues that an
organisation's structural design is necessarily heterogenous and
that the balance or mix of organisational cultures requires
constant assessment (1986: 75-107).
33. "The directive of the Department of National Education (at
that time Education, Art and Science) was that PACT should offer
opera, ballet and drama on a professional basis in the
Transvaal".
34. "The organisation set itself the goal of bringing these arts
to the whole Transvaal, cities as well as rural areas, for the
youth as well as adults, and for English- as well as Afrikaans-
speakers ."
35. "The Breytenbach Theatre... was totally inadequate for
building opera and ballet sets."
36. "The artistic standard of the performances was generally not
as would have been desired although there were certainly high
points. The lack of necessary experts and professional artists
was a great drawback. Programmes were also shortchanged by the
almost total lack of trained and experienced theatre staff (stage
managers, lighting people, joiners/cabinet makers, decor painters
and costume makers)."
37. As Mannie Ma rum observed in 1976:
We have only to look at what has happened in the White
country districts to see how constant use has improved
the venues for theatre in even the tiniest and most
poverty-stricken towns, (cited in Calburn, 1976: 40)
38. I have discussed the politics of PACT'S outreach programmes
elsewhere (see, Steinberg & Meintjies, 1992).
39. Both Eghard van der Hoven and Pierre van Pletzen stressed
this point in their interviews (09/12/1991, Pretoria and
13/11/1991, Pretoria, respectively).
40. The ratio of PACT'S artistic to non-artistic permanent staff
(see Appendix B) is higher than that of the Royal National
Theatre in London, for example, (Morgan, 1992: 2); similarly,
PACT'S box office returns are comparably low (see Appendix D).
41. Bhekisizwe Peterson estimated in 1991 that in the Pretoria-
Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area alone, more than one hundred
groups, largely amateur, were actively involved in workshopped
drama productions (cited in Holloway, 1993: 17).
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Within the organisation, PACT Drama functions with
virtually complete independence, its only
answerability being on the level of artistic
quality. ("PACT Drama in the 90s", n/d: n/p)
The need for supervision in the PACT hierarchy is clearly at a
minimum. Senior staff act autonomously from the structure to
which they account. This is not, it will be argued here, due
to a flexibility and liberalism within the organisation.
Rather, it is the function of a like-mindedness among the
senior staff and a consequent shared vision with regard to the
role of the organisation. PACT, under the watchful eye of the
government-appointed Board of Directors, selects its senior
staff - in part, at least - according to their ideological
outlooks. This, it will be further argued, is the primary
means by which government hegemony is maintained in PACT.
The first indication of the homogeneity of PACT'S senior staff
is its "group-think" condition: PACT is too like-minded and
cohesive to challenge assumptions, to check out facts or to
explore new options. "Group think" is the function of a
management that tolerates and nurtures "one set of people, one
philosophy; that distrusts outsiders, dislikes conflict and
expects continuity" (Handy, 1990: 126-7).
There is evidence of PACT'S "group-think" condition throughout
its history. One example is a statement from the General
Director in 1979. "The face of the theatre has changed since
the beginning of this decade", argued Eghard van der Hoven,
"the theatre can now say almost anything (within reason) in
any way it likes" (PACT Annual Report 1979: n/p).
The 1970s was a decade in which the concept of a racially
integrated theatre space - like the recently established
Market Theatre - contravened the law (the Group Areas Act).
Drama performance itself was, for the state, a site of overt
repressive action: plays - like Shezi's Shanti and Rente's Too
late - were banned by the Publications Control Board; several
Black Consciousness theatre groups - like the Theatre Council
of Natal and the People's Experimental Theatre - were
destroyed by government action; theatre workers were harassed,
detained, arrested, placed under house arrest and banned
(Orkin, 1991: 130-2).
Yet van der Hoven thought it credible, in 1979, to claim that
censorship in South Africa was at a minimum. This is an
indication of the ideological environment from which he was
writing: one of consensus and unchallenged assumption. Van
der Hoven's statement suggests that firstly, PACT was
insulated from state repression due to its avoidance of
artistic-cum-political transgression, and secondly, and more
surprisingly, that the senior staff were oblivious to it.
A more recent example of PACT'S "group-think" condition lies
in its response to its critics. When PAWE and the ANC
suggested, in the early 1990s, that PACT'S artistic policies
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had political underpinnings and implications, Louis
Bezuidenhout accused them of "trying to coax PACT into the
political arena" (PACT/TRUK Info. 1992: 2). Bezuidenhout was
assuming that PACT - and art more broadly - exists outside of
political processes. Even the act of contesting this
assumption is, for Bezuidenhout, an unnecessary and expedient
politicisation of art. This attitude surely arises from an
environment in which concepts of art, culture and politics are
uncontested and naturalised.
The second indication of the like-mindedness of PACT'S
decision-makers is its staffing policy. PACT'S senior staff,
with rare and recent exception, come from white petit
bourgeois backgrounds. Of its 21 senior officials, as at
March 1991, all were white (PACT Annual Report 1990-1991: 18-
9)". Employing people from only one narrow section of the
South African population serves, in itself, to restrict the
range of political and artistic views within the organisation.
In addition, the government appointed Board, who has a hand in
selecting senior staff, has, no doubt, played its part in
ensuring that PACT'S decision-makers reflect the composition
and the views of the government.
PACT does not, therefore, need to school its senior staff in
company policy or police them in this regard. Government and
internal censorship are at a minimum: those empowered to make
artistic choices automatically confine themselves within the
ideological parameters acceptable to the state20. This has
far-reaching implication for the democratisation of PACT: a
simple change of policy and government directive is unlikely
to be effective. If power is not - and cannot be -
implemented in a top-down manner, then it is insufficient
simply to make changes at the top. The attitudes of the staff
who run PACT on a daily basis will not be transformed by new
organisational policy. Individuals are vehicles of power, and
not, as totalizing theories would have it, its points of
application.
At the other end of the scale, PACT'S black employees have,
throughout the organisation's thirty year history, been
confined to the lower echelons of the organisation's artistic,
technical and administrative hierarchies. Van der Hoven
justifies this with the claim that there has never been a
black person of sufficient skill and competence to occupy a
senior position (Eghard van der Hoven, Author interview,
09/12/1991, Pretoria).
Many of the black stage crew have worked for PACT for two or
three decades (Bulbulia, 1991: 13). It is improbable that
they all failed to accumulate the level of experience
necessary for senior technical positions. More likely, black
staff were overlooked for promotion, blocked from assuming
more skilled and influential positions in the organisation.
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begun the process of transforming their society into a
democratic, non-racial, non-sexist society;
BE IT RESOLVED that the FIA condemns—the abhorrent
labour relations practices of the Performing Arts Council
of the Transvaal (South Africa), their obstinate refusal to
recognise PAWE as a legitimate union, and their persecution
of the PAWE members;
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the FIA condemns the
reticence of the South-African [sic] Provincial Arts
Councils to democratic change, and notes with dismay the
unwillingness of these institutions to negotiate in good
faith with representative democratic cultural
organisations. (FIA, 1992: n/p)
27. The Directorate accounts to the Board of Directors. But the
latter is a non-executive structure and de facto control resides
with the Directorate.
28. For a discussion about the way in which different
organisational structures affect different organisational
cultures and philosophies, see Handy (1990), pp.99-100.
29. Handy (1986) delineates four major organisational cultures
which he names after four Greek gods.
30. There are many more incidents that reflect PACT'S poor labour
relations with its artistic staff. Its handling of the Gaynor
Young tragedy is a case in point. In December 1989, actress
Gaynor Young was seriously injured when she walked off a stage
during a PACT production of Camelot. PACT'S subsequent response
to her claim for compensation, coupled with its reaction to the
allegations that it does not adequately provide for the safety
of its employees in terms of section 24(1) of the Machinery and
Occupational Safety Act of 1983, demonstrates the organisation's
inhumane and cavalier attitude towards its employees. (See
Steadman. 1990: 6-8 and Anon, 1990. "The Gaynor Young Inquiry").
31. I have argued for Pact's fearful reaction to the demands of
transitional South Africa elsewhere:
PACT refuses to go out and meet the new South Africa;
it opts rather to turn inward and take up a defensive
position.
It is this fear which prevented PACT from engaging
with the August 7 protesters in a less legalistic and
more open-minded manner. It also explains PACT'S
refusal to take part in public debates. In the last
few months alone, PACT turned down invitations to take
part in scheduled discussions on Agenda and Radio 702.
They also ducked out of a COSAW panel discussion on
the future of the performing arts. (Steinberg &
Meintjies, 1992: 13)
34
a significant agency within the PACs" (Louw, 1989: 115).
21. This is laid down by the Labour Relations Act (No. 28 of
1956).
22. Although PACT'S labour relations with SAFTU were by no means
progressive, they were not hostile. PACT certainly attempted to
weaken and undermine SAFTU. For example, PACT withdrew from the
South African Association of Theatre Managements (SAATM) and
hence from industry level negotiations in July 1990 at the point
at which SAFTU's revised and fairer standard theatre contract was
to be adopted by the SAATM. But PACT recognised and dealt with
SAFTU: it never attempted to rid itself of the union.
23. A PAWE discussion paper argues that
As PAWE begins to negotiate with PACT about the shop
floor grievances of its members, it is important for
us to develop a broader set of demands and guidelines
with regard to the PACs... if PAWE is to become an
equity that participates in the shaping of theatre
policy in a new South Africa, it is necessary for us
to think beyond our immediate problems, like poor
wages and working conditions, etc... it is our belief
that these immediate problems cannot be solved until
the PACs undergo a fundamental restructuring
process... For it is obvious that our working
conditions can never be satisfactory while we work for
an apartheid institution that defined its policy
without our interests at heart and without consulting
us. ("PAWE discussion paper on Performing Arts
Councils (PACs) policy", n/d: 1)
24. PPWAWU and PAWE reached an agreement in 1990 whereby the
former would organise the blue collar workers and the latter the
performing arts workers. The two unions nurture a relationship
of mutual co-operation and support. For example, PAWE
spearheaded the media campaign for the re-instatement of the 299
dismissed PPWAWU workers.
25. The role played by the Board of Directors in the strike will
not be explored here. Suffice to say that the Board did not—
although it was entitled to—override the Directorate's decisions
with regard to the PPWAWU saga.
26. This point was made by the Federation of International Actors
(FIA), an umbrella body comprising equities from 39 countries in
August 1992. FIA unanimously adopted the following resolution
at its International Conference in Montreal:
WHEREAS the Government subsidised Provincial Arts
Councils of South Africa have long been the guardians of
apartheid culture and have grossly neglected the
aspirations of the majority of South Africans;
AND WHEREAS the people of South-Africa [sic] have
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This view is supported by PACT management's racial attitude,
manifest in a myriad tell-tale signs. For example, PACT'S
Annual Report of 1981 lists the names of the organisation's
employees -categorised, as was PACT'S practice since 1963,
according to race. While the white employees are catalogued
according to their surnames and initials, the black employees
are catalogued according to their first names only. This
illustrates the Directorate's attitude, in 1981, towards its
black staff: they are perpetual menial labourers rather than
people acquiring skills in order to advance their careers.
In the 1990s, while the more obvious signs of racial bias
have, to a large extent, been eradicated, the racial
stratification of PACT remains unchanged: blacks are confined
to the more menial forms of labour. Their promotion to more
senior posts would, it is suggested here, profoundly
destabilise the environment of consensus and compliance on
which PACT relies in order to maintain its preferred ideology.
(ii) Internal control: Industrial Relations (IR)
The autonomy and artistic freedom enjoyed by PACT'S senior
staff is increasingly curtailed as one moves down the
organisational hierarchy. For, as the demographical profile
of its workforce becomes more reflective of South African
society, so PACT'S hegemonic control weakens and, in direct
proportion, its IR regime harshens.
This section will explore PACT'S attitude towards its black
workforce - those confined to lower grade, more menial, jobs
and, to a lesser extent, its artistic staff. To this end, two
recent - and characteristic - incidents will be explored:
PACT'S dismissal of the 299 Paper Printing Wood and Allied
Workers Union (PPWAWU) workers, and its refusal to recognise
the Performing Arts Workers Equity (PAWE).
PPWAWU, a Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)
affiliate, approached PACT for recognition in February 1990.
By May, the union had furnished PACT with the stop-order forms
verifying its majority representation. PACT contested
recognition on the grounds that PPWAWU was not registered as
representing the performing arts. This objection has no legal
basis. PACT refused to provide stop order facilities on the
basis that firstly, it required leave from the Department of
Manpower (which, legally, it did not), and secondly, that
certain signatures on the stop order forms were inauthentic.
In July PPWAWU declared a dispute with PACT in respect of
these issues (and others).
During lunch hour on 23 September 1990, some seven months
after the union's initial request for recognition, the PPWAWU
workers engaged in an illegal "wild cat" strike. The stated
cause of the strike was PACT'S failure to provide the workers
with stop-order facilities. After about one hour of work
stoppage, PACT, represented by Attorney van Deventer,
summarily dismissed the 299 strikers with immediate effect.
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The union informed PACT, twice, that their members were
prepared to return to work. These offers were rejected.
PPWAWU contested the dismissal of its members in the
industrial court in August 1991. Magistrate Bulbulia found
that
the illegality of the strike was far outweighed by
the rather unfair and cavalier manner with which the
respondent dealt with the strikers. (Bulbulia, 1991:
22)
His ruling was punitive: he ordered the reinstatement of the
workers with full back-pay - that is, retrospective for six
months.
PACT appealed the case and did not reinstate the workers. The
Labour Appeal Court heard the case in September 1992 - two
years after the dismissal - and Judge van Zyl upheld
Bulbulia's finding, extended the period of back-pay, and
denied PACT leave to appeal. He described the dismissals as
"precipitate and ill-considered" (Van Zyl, 1992: 17). PACT
did not reinstate the workers but, instead, petitioned the
Judge President who, in November 1992, granted PACT leave to
appeal.
In November 1993, the Appeal court - the highest court in the
country - found in favour of PPWAWU. It ordered PACT to
reinstate the dismissed workers with back-pay retrospective
from 16 December 1991 - the date of the initial industrial
court ruling.
PAWE first requested recognition from PACT in 1990 on the
basis that it represented most of the PACT Drama Company.
After prevaricating for several months, PACT'S attorney, van
Deventer, broke off negotiations in September 1991 on the
premise that PAWE was not a bona fide trade union:
We have a problem in the sense that in the May 1991
edition of the newsletter of SAFTU it was disclosed
that PAWE is a political organisation. That ,
statement was signed by your Chairman... If you are
indeed a purely political organisation kindly inform
us on what basis our client must then attend to
collective bargaining with you. (Van Deventer, 1991:
1)
Van Deventer was referring to a PAWE position paper that
describes the equity as "non-aligned": "political... but...
not party political" (cited in SAFTU News Update/
Bybrinqblaadiie. 1991: 1). PACT'S wilful misconstrual of this
statement was a clumsy prevarication tactic. An organisation
is, by law, disqualified from union status only if it
formally affiliates to a political organisation'1. South
Africa's black trade union movement has, particularly in the
last decade, effectively and lawfully married IR and political
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art forms and aesthetic standards, and the resulting
marginalisation of the indigenous.
9. The object of this paper is drama; the other performing (and
creative) arts and their management by PACT are discussed where
they overlap or affect drama. This is quite extensive: PACT'S
Eurocentric character - its centring of the European "high arts"
- impacts fundamentally on its management of drama.
10. See Steinberg (1991) for a fuller version of this argument.
11. This position is held by the local press. Barry Ronge, for
example, one of South Africa's most influential cultural critics,
fears that the transformation of the PACs means a "cultural
bloodbath" (Ronge, 1993: 17). The Weekly Hail, more surprisingly
perhaps, expresses a similar prejudice in its coverage of the
Natal Performing Arts Council's (ijlAPAC)'s recent financial
difficulties (Tyler, 1993: 25).
12. My work in PAWE (of which I am a founding executive member)
over the last four years has entailed representing to management
- as accurately as possible - the views of PACT'S blue-collar
workers (and, to a lesser extent, PACT'S Drama Company); I have
run numerous in-house PAWE workshops on the future of PACT. As
a result, this paper does not rely on formal interviews with PAWE
members and organisers; rather, my experiences as participant
observer in PAWE are infused into the fabric of this paper.
13. The members are listed in PACT'S Memorandum of Association.
14. Before 1986, the Transvaal Administrator was the ex officio
chair.
15 "ACT had started to desegregate its audiences and casts, de
facto, in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
16. For a discussion of the "arms-length" principle, see Fisher,
1987.
17. In fact, the directors of the Drama Department claim that
they have never even read or been told about policy guidelines
other than those contained in their own document.
18. The Drama Department directors surmise that should they alter
the Department's vision extensively, the Directorate would
probably intervene. But, they add, such a situation has never
occurred (Pierre van Pletzen, et al, Author interview, 13/11/91,
Pretoria).
19. The only change to this profile is the 1993 appointment of
Walter Chakela to the position of Assistant Director of Drama.
20. Of course there might be individuals in PACT who do not share
the dominant organisational vision. The point is that
alternative and oppositional views "do not seem to have become
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ENDNOTES
1. Both PACT and the Department of Education and Science insisted
on PACT'S racial exclusivity until the late 1970s. In 1972, for
example, the General Director noted PACT'S attempts
to satisfy all tastes and to provide constant
opportunities for people from all levels of the white
population. (PACT Annual Report, 1972: n\p)
2. . Nowhere does the iconography of power emerge
in a South African context with greater
clarity than in the piazza of the State
Theatre in Pretoria... Steynberg's over-
scaled Strydom (sic) head with its sundial
shadow must surely be one of the most naked
and banal expressions of political power to
dominate any public place. (Dubow, 1984:
117)
3. I have argued this elsewhere (Steinberg, 1993: 28-150).
4.Broadly defined, an "arm's-length" body is a statutory body
that, on the one hand, is financially accountable to parliament,
while on the other, manages its funds on terms of its own
choosing. The "arm's-length" body therefore, in theory, acts as
a buffer between politicians and artists.
5. PACT always allocate the largest proportion of its budget to
the European "high arts" - opera, ballet and orchestra. In the
1970s, its orchestra received a larger slice of the subsidy cake
than any other department (see, for example, PACT Annual Report
1970) . In the last few years, the opera department has
consistently received the largest budget (see, for example, PACT
Annual Report 1990-91).
6. Internal colonialism is a "special type" of colonialism since
both the coloniser and colonised occupy the same territory. In
other words, the typical features of colonialism exist, but there
is not the geographical separation of metropole and colony.
7. See Ashcroft et al, 1989, for a summary of the major post-
colonial cultural theorists.
8.In this article, "Eurocentric" and "indigenous" are polarised
for conceptual clarity. In practice, however, the two categories
are often blurred. "Indigenous" signifies locally
written/workshopped/choreographed/conceived, rather than non-
Western. It is not a purist concept. Hence, Sarafina is
"indigenous", even though it is derived from the Broadway musical
genre and may play in a proscenium arch theatre (much like the
European Cubist movement derives its inspiration and style from
African art) . The point is that Saraf ina was made by South
Africans and represents an aspect of South African experience.
"Eurocentrism" signifies, by contrast, the mimicry of European
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agendas.
PACT'S attitude towards PPWAWU and PAWE can be described as
"uniophobic", that is, "'an employer's abnormal fear of trade
unions and their activities'" (Industrial Court ruling cited
in Steadman, 1990: 3). But, significantly, PACT'S
"uniophobia" is partial: it does not extend to other unions on
its shop floor. By 1990, PACT had, for some years, recognised
the Entertainment Workers Union, the PACT Staff Association
(the in-house union established shortly after PPWAWO requested
recognition) and the South African Film and Theatre Union
(until its incorporation into PAWE in January 1992)22.
PACT'S "uniophobia" emerged only in 1990 with the appearance
on its shop floor of political unions. At its formation, PAWE
tacitly aligned itself with the anti-apartheid unions (COSATU
and NACTU) in arguing that it must eradicate the apartheid
legacy from the performing arts industry as well as - and in
order to - address shop floor issues23. PAWE and PPWAWU, as a
COSATU affiliate, were natural allies - in terms of their IR
and political agendas - on PACT'S shop floor24.
PACT'S ultra-conservative IR practices were, it is argued
here, largely a response to a perceived political peril.
Throughout its history, PACT was despised for its apartheid
practices. In the early 1990s, it stubbornly resisted the
winds of political change. The anti-apartheid unions, like
PPWAWU and PAWE, therefore constituted a frightening threat -
way beyond the level of shop floor issues - from within.
PACT'S apparently irrational behaviour towards PPWAWU can be
understood only from this perspective. Management, it seemed,
was determined to rid itself of a loyal and experienced
workforce. Host of the dismissed workers had given PACT
many - as much as twenty-six - years of service (Bulbulia,
1991: 13); they were not a recalcitrant workforce - this was
their first work-stoppage; and they had developed considerable
expertise over their years of service - PAWE members
complained that after the dismissals, the State Theatre stages
became increasingly hazardous due to comparative lack of skill
of the "scabs". Yet PACT would risk losing almost R3 million
in back-pay and at least R30 000 in legal fees (Pamela Stein
[PPWAWU attorney], Author Interview, 16/09/1992, Johannesburg)
rather than reinstate these workers.
PACT'S attitude was retrogressive even in the context of South
Africa's racist labour relations; it was out of kilter with
other parastatals. As early as 1980, there were no legal
obstacles to dealing with black unions, and from the late
1980s, the state's resistance to unionism in the public sector
was crumbling. Even the railways - one of South Africa's
most regressive and conservative sectors with regard to IR -
had, by 1987, conceded the necessity of recognising the
independent black unions. With regard to industrial relations
then, PACT lagged behind the most conservative of the
managements in the most conservative of sectors.
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A comparison between the 1987 railway workers strike and the
1991 PPWAWU strike illustrates this contention. The parallels
between the two strikes are marked, despite the difference in
scale: the South African Transport Services (SATS) dismissed
16 000 striking South African Railway Workers Union (SARWU)
workers. Both companies are parastatals; both angered workers
with their racial inequality with regard to wages, hierarchy,
etc; in both, recognition was the underlying issue. Like
PACT, SATS' hostility to COSATU was motivated by its
perception of the federation's political agenda, and, again
like PACT, this manifested in a "desperate attempt to maintain
the in-house union system" (Baskin, 1991: 174) - the PACT
Staff Association in the case of PACT; the Black Trade Union
in the case of SATS.
Baskin further argues that the SATS strike elicited differing
responses from the "reformers" and the "hardliners" in senior
management strata. The former argued that SATS had to "move
with the times and negotiate a settlement" (Baskin, 1991:
180); the latter saw COSATU "as a threat to the apartheid
status quo on the railways" (Ibid). PACT, it would appear,
was also at the mercy of a small group of hardliners intent on
maintaining the apartheid status quo. Judge van Zyl made
specific reference to the behaviour of Dennis Reinecke, PACT'S
General Director at the time of the dismissal, and more
particularly, of Attorney van Deventer, implying that they
were personally responsible for PACT'S "precipitate and ill-
considered" behaviour. The role of these individuals cannot
be discounted in the attempt to explain PACT'S retrogressive
labour relations25.
The 1987 SATS strike led to "a fundamental rethinking of the
position of workers in the public sector" (Ibid: 171). In a
short space of time, the railway workers' demands - most
importantly, the right of their union to be recognised - were
echoed and won by Post Office workers, the electricity
workers, the health workers, the educational workers, and the
police and prison warders (Ibid: 183).
What is most disturbing and striking about the parallels
between the SATS and PACT strikes is that the former predates
the latter by five years - a period in which another IR and
political era was ushered in. PACT'S refusal to recognise its
unions coupled with its unwillingness to negotiate broader
issues of transformation locates it on the far right of the
political spectrum26.
It has been argued here that PACT'S harsh IR regime was
prompted by a perceived political peril. In its effort to
preserve its white, Eurocentric orientation, PACT attempted to
rid itself of unions that sought political, as well as
industrial, transformation. As Steadman argues with regard to
the PACs,
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The history of PACT, it was argued here, is one of a drive
towards centralisation. The outcome is an organisation that
is geared towards the production of the European "high arts"
and serves an elite white constituency. The transformation of
PACT from production house to grant-allocation agency - an
arts council - would whole-heartedly and forcefully redress
that legacy.
4. Conclusion
Any attempt to transform PACT in a top-down manner (a simple
change of policy and Board of Directors, for example), the
proceeding analysis suggests, would prove ineffectual.
Transformative processes would have to take account of the
role of middle management, of organisational culture, of IR
policy and of infrastructure. These factors, crucial in
determining the character of the organisation and the way in
which it manages the arts, are, in turn, shaped by the
relationship between the arts council and government.
In creating a democratic arts council, there is no simple
formula for this relationship. While the autonomy of the arts
council is surely a necessary condition of a democratic arts
sector in the South Africa context, government has an
obligation to attend to apartheid legacies; correct the
maldistribution of resources, skills and infrastructure in the
arts; and integrate cultural activities into broader social
development programmes. In order to fulfil this role, it is
suggested here, a subtle - partial - application of the "arms-
length" principle is required. On the one hand, the council
should negotiate its policy with government; it should work
with government to integrate cultural development into broader
social development; and it should account to parliament on the
level of policy. On the other hand, the council should
operate, in accordance with the "arm's length" principle, as a
buffer between political bureaucracies and the arts. It
should, like its international counterparts, uphold and
promote the right of persons to freedom in the practice of the
arts50. Within the parameters of its policy, and with
recourse to a court of law, it should distribute its funds as
it sees fit.
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employees was contingent on its racial and Eurocentric biases.
PACT created the environment for a handful of professional
(mainly "high") artists to "polish and improve [their] craft"
(PACT Annual Report 1977, n/p); the majority were denied
access to state funding.
A company of approximately twenty-five artists46 has been the
major beneficiary of state subsidy for drama in the Transvaal
each year47. In this context, perks such as PACT'S housing
subsidy scheme - a considerable "financial burden" amounting
to approximately R574 000 in 1984 (PACT Annual Report 1984-
1985: n/p) - are inappropriate luxuries and not, as PACT would
have it, the artist's right.
In the 1990s, PACT Drama Department's "three main functions"
are to:
provid[e] a platform for graduates and a measure of
security for senior artists as well as maintain[] a
balanced core of actors. (PACT Annual Report 1987-
1988 :11)
This orientation, it has been argued, favours trained and
established - and therefore, white - artists. It ignores the
underdevelopment of the South African theatre industry; it was
forged, perhaps, with an advanced European country in mind.
If PACT Drama is to achieve its self-proclaimed goal of
redressing apartheid imbalances (and, in doing so, nurturing
South African theatre), it must scale down its support of
professional theatre and increase and mainstream its
developmental activities. This entails a dual process of
shrinking the professional companies while training and
funding amateur and semi-professional companies.
To take this a step further, a developmental approach would
entail limiting PACT'S role as a producer and increasing its
capacity to fund and support independent companies; shifting
its focus from administering theatre complexes to actively
fostering the performing arts48.
PACT'S production-orientation is anomalous among (performing)
arts councils internationally. The traditional role of the
public arts agency4' is that of grant-allocation: the
distribution of public funds to organisations and
individuals - companies, theatres, producers, writers, etc -
outside of itself. The rationale is two-fold: accessibility
and diversity. By distributing its funds as widely as
possible, the arts council hopes to maximise the number and
range of artists who can access public support for their work.
The arts council is not, therefore, responsible for public
theatre complexes and their resident companies. These are
administered, instead, by the city or a board of trustees
accountable to the government.
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For the 1990s... it will be virtually impossible to
•achieve any more than minor adjustments in [working]
conditions unless there is a radical initiative
related to the political developments in the wider
arena. (Steadman, 1990: 1)
(iii) Internal Control: centralisation
Integral to PACT'S ability to maintain internal control and to
implement its policies is its highly centralised
organisational structure. PACT'S operations - artistic,
administrative, technical and personnel - are centrally
controlled and coordinated. The State Theatre, the Windybrow
and the Alexander (while it is leased by PACT) are
administered by the Pretoria head office. In respect of drama
productions, the Drama Department administration draws up
their budgets and plans their yearly production schedules; the
Personnel Department hires and fires their staff. Since all
departments account directly to the Directorate, power
converges at a single point in the organisation27.
PACT'S stated rationale for the centralisation of control is
financial. Centrally planned production schedules, for
example, can facilitate the sharing of productions between
Pretoria and Johannesburg. This is cost-effective, argues the
Drama Department, in that it cuts down the number of
productions, but not performances, that PACT mounts. In
addition, productions that originate - are rehearsed and
mounted - at the Windybrow "piggy-back" on the technical and
administrative structures and personnel of head office. This
reduces their costs considerably. Centralisation therefore
serves to streamline the organisation by avoiding duplication
of activities and resources (Pierre van Pletzen, et al, Author
interview, 13/11/1991, Pretoria).
This argument is pri/na facie spurious. PACT could devolve its
structures of control without creating superfluities. The
Windybrow, for example, could enjoy a high degree of artistic
autonomy while continuing to both utilise Pretoria's
facilities and exchange productions with the State Theatre.
PACT'S major - and unstated - rationale for centralising
control, it is argued here, is not financial, but political.
Throughout its history, PACT served a narrow political
agenda - to secure Afrikaner and later, white supremacy -
while fervently disavowing all political influence (Steinberg,
1993: 33-72). As an instrument of the apartheid state, PACT
has, since its inception, been opposed (to varying degrees) by
large sections of the public. Centralisation facilitated an
organisational culture that helped PACT to insulate itself
from and combat this hostility28.
PACT'S organisational culture is "Apollonian"29: the god of
order, rules and tight control reigns supreme in the corridors
of the State Theatre complex. PACT assumes and demands
predictability and stability; it codifies operations and sets
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down patterns. Its employees are
part of the machine, the interchangeable human
parts of Henry Ford's dream. The role, the set
of duties, is fixed. The individual is he, or
she, who is slotted into it. That the
individual has a name is irrelevant, a number
would do as well. That he [sic] has a
personality is downright inconvenient, because
he [sic] might then be tempted to express his
[sic] personality in his role and so alter the
role. (Handy, 1986: 21)
Key examples of PACT'S Apollonian culture have already been
discussed: senior staff are like-minded and compliant; the
black workforce is subjected to a harsh IR regime. Even the
artistic staff are dealt with in an authoritarian manner.
Their terms of employment, for example, include the "semi-
official secrets act" (Eichbaum, 1983: 3): a clause precluding
their communication with the press - even about a current
production, for example - without first obtaining the written
permission of management. The 1992 directive from Dennis
Reinecke, then General Director, forbidding all employees from
discussing politics on PACT'S premises is another case in
point30.
These are the strategies - and symptoms - of an organisation
that is threatened by the broader society in which it
operates31. Centralisation facilitated this strategic
approach. It maximised PACT'S ability to cope with crises
generated by either internal or external pressures: decision-
making occurred amongst a small group; senior management had a
broad perspective on developments within the organisation and
could maintain conformity of already established policies.
The organisational culture that PACT has cultivated
undermines, however, the superordinate goals of a PAC32.
PACT'S raison d'etre is (should be) the cultivation of
individual creativity and acumen; its organisational culture
promotes sameness and compliance. The performing arts
requires irregular working hours and high levels of self-
motivation; PACT'S IR regime is inflexible and harsh.
As long as PACT'S current organisational structure persists,
it may be impossible to create some of the other preconditions
for a democratic PAC. Centralisation would frustrate a
developmental programme, for example. PACT'S responsiveness
to the needs of the societies it serves would be blunted by a
centralised structure in which, by definition, the centre
commands the parts. Centralisation would, in addition,
directly obstruct the organisation's capacity to empower -
literally, to cede power and decision-making capacity to -
performing artists and their communities.
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(ii) The case against professionalisation
At face value, PACT'S three reasons for centralising its human
resources into large professional companies are seemingly
sound. A more thorough probe, however, reveals the
Eurocentric and racial biases that both informed and resulted '
from this process.
The National Party government attempted, particularly in the
1970s, to aggrandise ruling class Afrikaans culture by
transplanting the nineteenth century European "high arts".
PACT, in this ideological climate, focused on the "high arts"
and targeted an elite constituency; its earlier commitment to
promoting volkskultuur among the Afrikaner masses dwindled44.
The government pre-empted this trend when, in establishing the
PACs, it drew a sharp distinction between the professional and
amateur performing arts. "PACT'S function", decreed the
Department of Education, Arts and Science in 1962,
is limited to the fostering of the performing arts
on a professional basis. The fostering of the arts
on an amateur basis and the organising of amateur
organisations are and remain the responsibility of
NACAE. (cited in Niemand Commission. 1977: 82)
This distinction favoured the "high arts". Firstly, the "high
arts" are well served by - and, unlike other theatrical forms,
suffer without - large professional teams of artists and
technicians. Secondly, the PACs, who were mandated to present
the "high arts", became the major recipients of government
subsidy.
South African performing arts traditions, on the other hand,
effectively demoted to amateur status, largely fell outside of
PACT'S ambit, and instead became the responsibility of under-
resourced dramatic societies. PACT'S definition of providing
a cultural service to the Transvaal entailed, therefore, the
occasional visit from the ballet company or orchestra; the
support and development of community or folk theatre was not
on the agenda. The drive to increase the quality of PACT'S
("high arts") productions by creating larger professional
companies occurred, therefore, at the direct expense of the
South African performing arts.
The amateur/professional divide also favoured white performing
artists. Due to unequal training opportunities, most
professional performing artists - let alone "high artists" -
in South Africa were white. The PACs' exclusive focus on
professionals therefore effectively excluded blacks. This, in
turn, ensured that the bulk of state funding, earmarked for
the professional performing arts, was spent on whites45.
PACT'S contention that professionalisation promotes the
welfare of artists must be assessed within this context. For
PACT'S ability to normalise the working conditions of its
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The Opera Department and Orchestra presented similar arguments
(Quayle, 1974: 1-8). PACT'S second motivation for
professionalisation concerned the welfare of artists. It was
the duty of PACT, argued Eghard van der Hoven in 1976, to
rescue actors "from the tyranny of long tours, of one-night
stands" (cited in Calburn, 1976: 3). In addition, he
continued, PACT must respect actors' right to
full-time employ[ment] and... pension and medical
schemes, and paid holidays ranging from 28 to 42
days per year. Their salaries [should be]
guaranteed, whether they perform or not43. (Ibid:
27)
Van der Hoven was arguing, in effect, that the only way -to
normalise the working conditions of performing artists was to
create professional resident - that is, non-touring -
companies. PACT inherited only a handful of full-time
performing artists from the NTO in 1963. By 1976 over a
hundred actors were employed on a full-time basis by the four
PACs, and three full-time ballet companies employed about 130
ballet dancers (Ibid: 26-7). For van der Hoven, PACT had a
moral obligation to performing artists to continue this
process of professionalisation.
In the years that followed, PACT succeeded in expanding its
professional staff. By the time the State Theatre was
established, PACT employed more theatre personnel on a full-
time basis than any other organisation in the country (PACT
Annual Report 1981: 4).
In 1983, Scenaria. a local (pro-PACS) performing arts journal,
singled out PACT Drama from all South African theatre
managements for "special praise" with regard to its attitude
towards payment and working conditions. "Virtually all actors
who worked for PACT in recent years", reported Scenaria. "were
unstinting in their admiration for PACT'S commitment towards
the actors on their payroll" (Philoctetes, 1983: 14).
PACT'S third, and most recent, justification for its large
professional companies is financial. The art departments must
ensure - for PACT'S financial survival - that the State
Theatre's and Windybrow's lights are on every night of the
year. The safeguard for this is to schedule a programme of
in-house productions - that is, produced, directed and
performed by PACT staff - well in advance. A large permanent
company of performers serves this end efficiently and cost-
effectively: the company can perform one production while
rehearsing the next. Van Pletzen claims that the cost of the
Drama Department's yearly programme would double if there was
no permanent company (Author interview, 13/11/1991, Pretoria).
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"Institutions", note Schmid and Reissert,
function as filters for information and interests,
as incentives for individual or collective
behaviour, and thus immediately narrow the range of
conceivable decisions and actions... Institutions
thus have the character of pre-selections or pre-
decisions... Once established, however, they take on
a dynamic of their own and give rise to unplanned
steering effects. On account of their hidden-hand
function and inertia, they may clash with different
decision-making situations, new power relations, or
political intentions. (1988: 127)
3.3. THE POLITICS OF ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
PACT'S origin and inheritance was the National Theatre
Organisation (NTO). The NTO was administered from a small
office in Pretoria (the Marais Centre), and owned one modest
theatre (the 298 seater Breytenbach in Pretoria). The raison
d'etre of the NTO was touring - taking drama to the far-flung
corners of the country to service a sparsely populated white
South Africa.
Since the early 1980s, PACT has been synonymous with the State
Theatre (and its satellite, the Windybrow): most of its
activities - artistic, administrative and technical - take
place in that complex.
The history of PACT is one of a drive towards centralisation.
One of the primary ambitions of PACT'S leadership over the
years was to house all the organisation's activities under one
roof, in a "modern, computerised giant". (PACT Annual Report
1981: 2). The state Theatre - the largest of the "plush
palaces of the Performing Arts Councils [in which]
audiences... on occasion have numbered less than the actors on
stage" (Steadman, 1990: 1) - is the controversial triumph of
the centralisation crusade.
This section will explore the ways in which PACT'S artistic
policy, organisational policy and infrastructure dovetail to
mutually determine and compliment one another. It will be
argued that key elements of PACT'S artistic and political
character are determined by its centralised organisational
structure - that centralisation disposes PACT towards anti-
democratic practice: serving an elite sector of artists and
audiences. The inverse will also be argued: that the drive
towards the centralisation of infrastructure and control was
fuelled by two major factors - a Eurocentric vision of the
performing arts and an attempt to preserve PACT'S domination
by whites.
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3.3.1. Centralisation of infrastructure
PACT'S initial policy directive contained a fundamental
contradiction. On the one hand,
die opdrag van die Department nasionale Opvoeding
(destyds onderwys, Kuns en Wetenskap) was dat TRUK
opera, ballet, musiek en toneel op 'n
beroepsgrondslag in Transvaal sou aanbied...33
On the other,
die organisasie net homself ten doel gestel om
hierdie kunste aan die hele Transvaal te bring,
stedelik sowel as plattelands, vir sowel volwassenes
as die jeug en vir Engels sowel as
Afrikaanssprekendes. (Van der Hoven, 1974a: I)34
PACT was required to present the European "high arts" - in
accordance with European standards - and to take them to the
remote districts of the (white) rural Transvaal. But the two
functions conflicted directly.
The "high arts" require specialised performance venues in
which large permanent professional companies perform in a few
select theatres, serviced by substantial on-site technical and
administrative teams. They are not conducive to one-night
stands in the school and church halls of the rural Transvaal.
Touring companies, on the other hand, are handicapped by a
highly centralised infrastructure. They require, instead, a
decentralised network of theatres and administrations and
productions with simple, mobile sets.
This tension played itself out during the first two decades of
PACT'S existence. The fervent commitment to providing a
cultural service to the entire white province, so
enthusiastically voiced at PACT'S formation, whittled away.
PACT justified its process of centralisation - and the
concomitant undermining of its egalitarianism - on the grounds
that it was artistically and financially rational. It will be
argued here, however, that centralisation served an anomalous
Eurocentric dream and that it resulted in an elitist
organisation severed from its constituency.
(i) Before the State Theatre
From PACT'S establishment in 1963 until the opening of the
State Theatre in 1981, a number of complaints were
consistently voiced by senior management. These include the
"tyranny of tours", the inadequacy of performance venues, the
deficiency of the technical workshops, and the scattered
nature of PACT'S facilities. Underlying PACT'S discontent was
a single factor: the incapacity of the inherited NTO
infrastructure to adequately service the "high arts".
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In addition, PACT claims that it is the most cost-effective
organisation of its nature internationally", and that
nowhere else in the world is such a variety of
performances and presentations staged annually by a
single organisation as at PACT. (PACT Annual Report
1987-1988: 3)
The validity of these claims, although disputable40 is not the
issue here. What is being argued is that PACT'S distribution
of its income is inappropriate and undemocratic. The
government subsidy that PACT receives is the only public money
set aside for the performing arts in the Transvaal. The bulk
of this subsidy is used to finance the venues, companies,
workshops and administration of the State Theatre. None of it
reaches the myriad drama companies, dance groups and choirs of
the Transvaal, nor the independent theatres or producers".
Hence only a handful of performing arts workers (those working
at the State and, to a far lesser extent, the Windybrow), and
their limited audiences, enjoy subsidisation42.
3.3.2. Permanent, professional companies
Concurrent with its drive towards infrastructural
centralisation during the 1960s and 1970s was PACT'S crusade
for the centralisation of its human resources. Whereas the
NTO had developed small semi-professional or amateur touring
companies, PACT sought to establish large professional
resident companies.
PACT'S motivation for this trend was three-fold: that
professional companies produce higher quality theatre; that
they normalise conditions of employment for actors; and that
they are cost-effective. It is worth exploring these
arguments in some detail.
(i) The case for professionalisation
In its evidence to the Niemand Commission, PACT equated
professionalism with standards of excellence. The quality of
each company's productions, PACT claimed, was in direct
proportion to the degree of its professionalisation. PACT
Ballet, for example, accounted for its "period of stagnation"
in the early 1970s as follows:
With a company of 30 [professional] dancers we have
to literally employ part-time amateurs when
presenting the classics. These dancers, although
keen, have full-time positions outside the theatre
and are not available for rehearsals during the day.
They cannot tour, resulting in the production
suffering a reduction in numbers and loss of
artistic standard when it moves from Johannesburg to
Pretoria. ("Memorandum on the future development of
ballet", 1974: 11)
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tendency to try and achieve an international
standard as far as glamour was concerned. But
perhaps instead of spending a great deal of money on
spectacular performances perhaps we should change
our priorities and spend money on less ambitious
productions while trying to achieve a higher
artistic standard", (cited in Calburn, 1976: 32)
(ii) After the State Theatre
The State Theatre, under construction during the period of the
Niemand commission of Inquiry, put paid to the touring debate.
On its completion in 1981, PACT could centralise its resources
and activities, and neglect the outlying areas, in the name of
public responsibility. (Appendix A) illustrates the decline
in PACT'S rural tours during the period of the Niemand
Commission and a further decline after the establishment of
the State Theatre). In the words of Eghard van der Hoven, at
the State Theatre's inauguration:
The State Theatre must never become just another
theatre in South Africa... Our activities in this
building must always be worthy of its name: The
State Theatre. We must guard against the idea that
the theatre should be taken to the community; we
must put most of our resources and energy into this
building. We must centralise our activities. The
State Theatre is a prize possession of the nation,
of all our performing artists in this country. It
could also be the pride of artists in the
international field if we handle it well... (PACT
Annual Report 1981: 7-8, my emphasis).
Elitism was the culmination - and the intention - of the
inexorable logic of centralisation. From the inauguration of
the State Theatre until the "outreach era" of the early
1990s38, PACT was impervious, as the above statement reflects,
to the exclusive nature of its audiences.
The financial imperatives of the State Theatre afforded PACT
the confidence to repudiate one of its primary mandates as a
publicly funded organisation: to service the majority. Widely
regarded as one of the most luxurious theatre complexes in the
world, the State's construction costs amounted to a massive
R34 million (in 1981). Its maintenance and running costs are
enormous: PACT had to double its complement of full-time non-
artistic staff in order to run the State Theatre (see Appendix
B) ; the annual electricity bill alone amounts to about one
million rand. In addition, the costs recovered by the State
Theatre are consistently very low (see Appendix C).
In the State Theatre era, PACT'S notion of serving its tax
base hinged on variety and quality - and explicitly excluded
accessibility. It justified the State's national status on
the basis of its (ostensibly) multi-racial and multi-cultural
character.
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The Breytenbach Theatre's workshop, notes van der Hoven, "was
heeltemal ontoereikend... vir die bou van opera- en
balletstelle"" (Ibid). In addition, the type of scenography
required by the "high arts" could not be executed by inexpert
locals:'
Die gebrek aan die nodige deskundiges en
beroepskunstenaars was 'n groot remskoen. Programme
is ook gekortwiek deur die bykans totale gebrek aan
opgeleide en ervare teaterpersoneel
(verhoogbestuuders, beligtingsmeesters, skrynwekers,
decorskilders en kostumiers).M (Ibid: 2)
Further complaints with regard to the infrastructure included
the lack of on-site storage space for decor and costumes and
the fact that rehearsal venues (often church and school halls)
were not in the same complex as the administrative offices
(Ibid: 1). This grievance was echoed a decade later when PACT
appealed to the Niemand Commission of Inquiry to have all its
departments - artistic, administrative and technical - housed
under one roof (Van der Hoven, 1974: 2).
The principle obstacle to PACT'S proper functioning, however,
was, in its opinion, a twin factor: unsuitable performance
venues and frequent tours.
Touring with a ballet company on the Platteland is
soul destroying... It means performances in school
halls or unsuitable Town Halls...
The male dancer has only to execute one leap and he
is in the opposite wing... A male dancer of six foot
lifts' his partner above his head and this results in
her disappearance from the view of the audience.
Her head has disappeared into the grid and, due to
the borders hanging from the ceiling to mask the
lights, only her legs can be seen. ("Memorandum on
future development of PACT Ballet", 1974: 3-6)
PACT'S insistence that rural touring compromised the artistic
standards of its productions, as articulated above, was a
central component of its evidence to the 1977 Niemand
Commission of Inquiry into the performing arts. PACT Ballet
and PACT Opera (incorporating the orchestra) submitted
detailed memoranda to this effect (Ibid; Quayle, 1974: 3).
PACT argued that it could not afford to present "high arts"
productions in the major cities (Johannesburg and Pretoria)
and tour the rural circuit. The former, said PACT, consumed
most of its budget. Opera, ballet and orchestra, in
particular, are inherently expensive art forms: they require,
inter alia, large permanent artistic companies and substantial
teams of administrative and technical staff (Report of
Commission of Inquiry into the performing arts, hereafter,
Niemand Commission. 1977: 63). In any case, PACT argued,
touring was a financial burden: rural performances had to be
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cross-subsidised by city performances (Ibid: 67).
PACT'S memoranda to the Niemand Commission set up an
opposition between quality and touring. And its priority, as
expressed a few years earlier, was quite clear:
We must ask ourselves whether the time has not
arrived for the Board to consider whether PACT
should perform only at a few central places where
the necessary facilities already exist and where
productions of a high standard can be presented.
(PACT Annual Report 1972: n/p)
PACT was willing to sacrifice its initial ideal of ensuring
that the performing arts become "the democratic right of our
entire [white] community" (PACT Annual Report 1969: n/p) on
the altar of Eurocentric notions of art and quality.
The Niemand Commission was ambivalent towards PACT'S bid to
truncate its.touring schedule. On the one hand, it condoned
PACT'S attempts to "conform to a degree of excellence" (1977:
71) commensurate with European standards. "The theatre
building in which operas, operettas, and musical comedies are
jto be presented", notes the Commission, "must satisfy certain
standard requirements" - "overseas standards" (Ibid).
On the other hand, however, the Commission considered
"anomalous and unacceptable" (Ibid: 23) PACT'S attempts to
reduce touring:
The Commission understands the reasons and
motivations for these steps, [namely, financial
pressure and decline of artistic standards], but
cannot find that they are in harmony with the stated
objectives of the performing arts councils in regard
to serving the whole country. (Ibid: 24)
The Niemand Commission was torn between two conflicting
ideological imperatives. On the one hand, it was concerned to
entrench the "high arts" in Afrikaner culture. On the other,
it believed in cultivating a love of theatre among the whole
volk - rural and urban. In the end, and in contention with
PACT, the Commission leaned - if indecisively - towards the
latter.
Niemand sought ways to render rural touring more viable. He
suggested that PACT organise seasons in rural centres which
have suitable venues for audiences within a radius of 100 to
200 kilometres, rather than take plays to scattered and
isolated localities with little audience potential (Ibid: 24).
The costs of maintaining these theatre venues, recommended
Niemand, should be incurred by the provincial administration
rather than by the PAC (Ibid: 73).
Niemand, unlike PACT, was willing to relinquish sophistication
in order to bring theatre to the people. He proposed that
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multi-purpose halls - town halls, school halls,
church halls - erected with financial assistance
from the government should be designed to... provide
the minimum requirements for a stage performance.
(Ibid: 72)
In his view, a multi-purpose hall "with a level floor and
movable seats, a stage and dressing rooms" (Ibid: 72) was an
adequate performance venue for any PAC production. Based on
this principle, the Commission recommended "the establishment
of a network of proper accommodation for the performing arts"
(Ibid: 74).
This, in itself, was a viable suggestion. Partly due to
PACT'S influence, a solid network of reasonably well resourced
theatres had been established in the Transvaal by the mid
1970s37. Apart from the Civic in Johannesburg and the Piet
van der Walt Theatre in Pretoria, Welkom, Springs,
Vereeniging, Potchefstroom, Germiston, Pietersburg,
Klerksdorp, Vanderbijlpark, and Sasolburg were all equipped
with adequate performance venues.
Niemand undermined his recommendations, however, by refusing
to relinquish the "high arts" tradition. He knew that touring
"high arts" productions in rural South Africa was impractical.
Local production costs are "relatively higher than in Europe",
he noted, and in any event, "there is only a small (and
scattered) population with a Western culture" (Ibid: 16).
What Niemand should have suggested, then, was that PACT
curtail its "high arts" productions and present other,
"poorer", forms of theatre with which its infrastructure could
cope.
PACT'S resistance to Niemand's vision of a vibrant network of
theatres was, in one respect, anomalous. Entrenching the
performing arts in the culture of the white population was
PACT'S self-proclaimed goal and a prerequisite for its
survival. PACT'S reluctance towards touring, it is argued
here, can be explained only by unyielding Eurocentricity.
If PACT could not present the "high arts" it would present
nothing. Rather than forge a theatre appropriate to local
conditions - available finances, venues, technical facilities,
local talent, and so on - PACT argued, in effect, to withhold
the performing arts from large sections of its constituency.
Jeanne Coetzer, reacting to Eghard van der Hoven at a South
African Institute of Theatre Technology conference in 1976,
castigated PACT for precisely this issue:
"at various levels we seem[ed] to be comparing
ourselves with the Continent of Europe - with other
countries. Mr van der Hoven said that we liked to
present plays, ballet, opera of international
standard, but what exactly did we mean by
international standard? There seemed to be a
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